University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Political Science Faculty Publications

Political Science

2018

Mobilizing Doubt: The Legal Mobilization of Climate Denialist
Groups
Aaron J. Ley
University of Rhode Island, ajley@uri.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/psc_facpubs

The University of Rhode Island Faculty have made this article openly available.
Please let us know how Open Access to this research benefits you.
This is a pre-publication author manuscript of the final, published article.

Terms of Use
This article is made available under the terms and conditions applicable towards Open Access
Policy Articles, as set forth in our Terms of Use.
Citation/Publisher Attribution
Ley, A. J. (2018), Mobilizing Doubt: The Legal Mobilization of Climate Denialist Groups. Law & Policy, 40:
221-242. doi:10.1111/lapo.12103 Available at: https://doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12103

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Political Science at DigitalCommons@URI. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of
DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

Mobilizing Doubt: The Legal Mobilization of Climate Denialist Groups
Aaron J. Ley

Abstract: The climate change counter-movement (CCCM) deploys a broad repertoire of
tactics in its effort to cast doubt on the science of climate change. One important yet
understudied tactic is the effort by CCCM groups to use open records laws in
scientifically uncertain areas to cast doubt on the accuracy of scientific information. This
article explores the use of this tactic by CCCM groups and adds to the legal mobilization
literature in three ways. First, it traces the origin of CCCM groups to the broader
conservative legal movement of the 1970s that challenged the dominance of the liberal
legal network. Second, it shows how CCCM groups waged an open records campaign
against climate scientists in Virginia and Arizona, which caused a countermobilization by
scientists with their own legal campaigns. Finally, this article provides the first empirical
evidence of the effect of CCCM FOIA suits on the activities of university researchers. I
find, through in-depth personal interviews with twelve university researchers, that the
experience of researchers who have been exposed to open records campaigns has been
overwhelmingly negative, has caused them to communicate through different media, and
has imposed a new work burden that draws them away from other work responsibilities. I
argue that the costs of these tactics are narrowly borne by a concentrated group of
scientists whose production of knowledge is a public good that allows us to address the
crosscutting and relentless problem of climate change.

* The author would like to thank the editor and managing editor, the anonymous reviewers, Brian
Krueger, Charles Epp, and Douglas Edlin for the valuable insights that were incorporated into this
manuscript.
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I. Introduction
As the Earth warms, the politics of climate change keep getting hotter. In
1988, renowned climate modeler James E. Hansen sat before the Senate Committee
on Energy and Natural Resources and famously declared that “global warming is
now large enough that we can ascribe with a high degree of confidence a cause and
effect relationship to the greenhouse effect.” (Hansen 1988, 2) Twenty-seven years
later in February 2015, Senator James Inhofe (R-OK) brandished a snowball on the
US Senate floor as evidence that global warming is overblown. The tactics used by
climate deniers1 like Sen. Inhofe, which range from attracting media attention to
filing lawsuits to acquire the emails of climate scientists, are part of a broader effort
that aims to cast doubt on the scientific evidence that supports global warming.
An extensive climate change countermovement (CCCM) has emerged to
challenge the insights generated by scientists who seek to understand more about
the causes and consequences of global warming. Today’s scientists, together with
environmentalists who raise public consciousness about the negative effects of
climate change, represent forces of reflexive modernization (reflexivity) seeking to
address the multijurisdictional, crosscutting, and relentless problem of climate
change (see Beck 1992). It has been argued that our mastery of science and its
application to industrial capitalism has caused new fields of science to emerge,
called “impact science,” that seek to address the severe environmental
consequences that are borne by current generations and that threaten to be passed
on to future ones (McCright and Dunlap 2010). Fields of inquiry that qualify as
impact science, like climate science, are increasingly being challenged by advocacy
2

organizations and conservative think tanks that, despite their lack of scientific
credentials, question the legitimacy of climate science as a field and impugn
individual scientists conducting climate research (Brulle and Dunlap 2015; Dunlap
and Jacques 2013). This strategy has yielded a large stockpile of contrarian
information and strategies—veritable field manuals—that are written by
conservative think tank–sponsored authors and published by conservative presses
(Dunlap and Jacques 2013; Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008). A large-scale and
sophisticated network of conservative commentators disseminate this contrarian
information through the news media by “employ[ing] arguments against global
warming that have long been debunked in the scientific literature” and by
“repeat[ing] allegations against climate scientists that have no basis,” often with
“virtual impunity” (Elsasser and Dunlap 2012, 14). Recent empirical studies
demonstrate that these efforts are heavily influenced by corporate benefactors and
that they powerfully influence the media narrative about climate change (Farrell
2016a, 2016b). Moreover, it has been shown that donor-directed organizations,
otherwise known as dark money organizations, serve as the primary funding
mechanism that allows CCCM activities to persist (Brulle 2014). For McCright and
Dunlap (2010), all of these activities undertaken by CCCM organizations represent a
“highly potent force of anti-reflexivity” that seeks to reassert the dominance of the
industrial capitalist social order by intimidating scientists and manipulating
research in ways that manufacture doubt.
If the production and dissemination of contrarian information to cast doubt
on climate science research has captured the imagination and attention of scholars

3

as a time-honored tactic of CCCM organizations, then another CCCM strategy that
deserves equal attention as part of their broader repertoire of tactics is the
execution of open records campaigns to gain access to the data and correspondence
of scientists engaged in climate science research. Scholars have long recognized the
critical importance of legal resources that, once invoked, raise consciousness and
constitute meaning during the hard-fought policy conflicts waged by everyday
people making rights-based claims (McCann 1994). Indeed, many of these legal
resources were forged in earlier battles being fought by liberal public interest
groups as they challenged the power of corporate influence and sought to open
administrative policy venues for greater political participation (McCann 1986).
While much scholarly attention has focused on the legal mobilization strategies and
tactics of grassroots and social movement organizations that are making rightsbased claims, this manuscript examines the adoption of similar tactics by
conservative legal groups as they countermobilize against the scientific consensus of
climate change. In doing so, this paper shows how CCCM organizations with
corporate ties have reappropriated open records laws and now use them in
scientifically uncertain and technically complex policy areas to cast doubt on the
accuracy of information that is communicated to the lay public. These groups are, in
effect, engaging in the consciousness-lowering tactic of manufacturing uncertainty
(Michaels 2006), and theories of legal mobilization should begin to take these
countermobilization efforts into account. I argue that the costs of these tactics,
especially when they are used instrumentally to interfere or cast doubt on the
generation of scientific knowledge, are narrowly borne by a concentrated group of
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scientists whose production of knowledge is a public good that allows us to address
the crosscutting and relentless problem of climate change.
Given that procedural rights of access were developed by predominately
liberal public interest groups to mobilize against corporate power, I am interested
in learning about the effects of the adoption of these tactics. In this study I trace the
existence of CCCM legal groups to the broader conservative legal movement that
emerged to challenge the dominance of the liberal legal network (see Teles 2008). I
also describe how the formation of CCCM legal groups was followed by the
execution of two high profile litigation campaigns against Pennsylvania State
University climate scientist Michael Mann and University of Arizona researchers
Jonathan Overpeck and Malcolm Hughes. In response to the CCCM legal campaigns
against Professors Mann, Overpeck, and Hughes, I show how the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP), the Union of Concerned Scientists
(UCS), the Climate Science Legal Defense Fund (CSLDF), and various other actors
countermobilized in support of climate researchers. Finally, if CCCM legal groups are
now commonly using legal mobilization campaigns as a strategy to undermine
reflexivity, then I am interested in the empirical effect of these FOIA campaigns on
the behavior and experiences of university researchers. In the last section of this
manuscript, I use personal interviews with climate researchers and other university
scholars to explore how (and through what means) scholars are communicating
about their research in the aftermath of these requests. I turn now to the
development and ascendance of climate denialist legal actors and their links to the
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broader conservative legal movement, followed by a discussion of the legal
campaigns against Professors Mann, Hughes, and Overpeck.

II. The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement and the CCCM Legal
Campaign against Professors Mann, Overpeck, and Hughes.
A. The Conservative Legal Movement and CCCM Organizations.
Scholars have written extensively about the factors giving rise to the largescale rights-based litigation campaigns undertaken by advocacy organizations that
fought for gender equality and civil rights. These movements witnessed the
emergence of an institutional support structure of litigants that altered the “supply”
of cases at all levels of the judiciary (Epp 1998). Without a similar conservative legal
strategy in place, liberals exploited the judiciary as an underdefended policy terrain
on which to advance their rights-based claims (Teles 2008). While organizations
such as the NAACP and ACLU had for years executed a rights-based legal strategy,
Southworth (2005) observes that public interest law firms had emerged and
distinguished themselves “by pursuing broader issue agendas and expanding the
range of strategies to include not only constitutional litigation but also other types
of law reform litigation and administrative and legislative advocacy” (1234-1235).
These efforts included passing broad freedom of information and open meetings
laws to make bureaucracies more transparent and, it was hoped, accountable to the
people.
It was during this time that law schools were built into bona fide producers
of public goods for a vast network of liberals that sought policy change through the
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judiciary (Teles 2008). Law schools groomed the next army of public interest
lawyers by training them through in-house legal clinics, which allowed young
attorneys to hone their skills before entering the real world of legal conflict against
experienced corporate attorneys (Teles 2008). Young, energetic, and committed
public interest lawyers repeatedly pressured the judiciary to force compliance with
environmental, consumer protection, and workplace protection statutes, and federal
judges began striking down laws they deemed “arbitrary,” “capricious,” or an “abuse
of agency discretion” (Shapiro 1988).
Conservatives, meanwhile, learned that a strategy for competing with liberals
meant replicating the public interest law model by increasing their presence in law
schools (Southworth 2005). Wealthy businessmen and chemical manufacturers like
John M. Olin were constantly embroiled in conflict with administrative agencies that
were now pressured by newly graduated public interest lawyers to zealously
regulate. Olin directed his foundation to begin funding programs to bolster the
presence of conservatives in higher education and, especially, in law schools, where
his foundation supported the establishment of “beachheads” for conservative
intellectuals. Another part of the Olin Foundation strategy was to deliver support for
conservative intellectuals by funding the establishment of programs in Law and
Economics—a legal philosophy that directly challenged the liberal legal paradigm—
at some of the nation’s most elite law schools (Mayer 2016). Another important
national development occurred when numerous small chapters of the Federalist
Society were formed, allowing conservative ideas to begin gaining more traction in
American law schools. The institutionalization of the Federalist Society gave young
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conservatives more opportunities to articulate their ideas through debate, brought
what at the time seemed to be off-the-wall legal ideas into the mainstream, and
allowed young conservatives to network with one another (Hollis-Brusky 2015;
Teles 2008).
Arguably the Olin Foundation’s most important strategy was establishing
beachheads for conservative legal intellectuals where institutional resources could
be used to train a new generation of legal activists on how to mobilize law in
support of the industrial capitalist order. One of the most widely recognized
sanctuaries for legal conservatives is the George Mason University School of Law
(GMUSL), now named the Antonin Scalia Law School. GMUSL was made prominent
by Henry Manne whose advocacy for the establishment of Law and Economics
training programs for students and practitioners was felt at law schools throughout
the country (Teles 2008). Many viewed Law and Economics, built on the neoclassical economic model, as a theoretically elegant vehicle for institutionalizing and
justifying free market capitalism in ways that were attractive to law students and
practitioners, like judges, who commonly attended Law and Economics seminars.
Stephen Teles (2008) described Henry Manne as,
…. [having been] able to build a law school [GMUSL] with a durable
libertarian character. The ideological coloration of the school allowed
it to actively seek to advance the interests of the larger conservativelibertarian movement, by providing an institutional space in which
scholars out of the legal academic mainstream can develop a scholarly
reputation and move on to higher-status institutions (219).
Today, GMUSL provides students with clinical opportunities and program centers
that owe their existence to conservative donors such as DonorsTrust, a 501(c)3
organization that finances climate denialist groups and “was established . . . to
8

ensure the intent of donors who are dedicated to the ideals of limited government,
personal responsibility, and free enterprise.”2 The law school also provides students
opportunities to gain clinical experience through conservative public interest law
clinics such as the George Mason Environmental Law Clinic, which was later
renamed The Free Market Environmental Law Clinic after dissociating from the
university.3 One of the most prominent associates of the Free Market Environmental
Law Clinic was its former Director David Schnare, who became a key part of
President Donald Trump’s EPA Transition Team and maintained a relationship with
the American Tradition Institute (ATI), the organization that brought lawsuits
against prominent climate researcher Michael Mann for access to his emails.
B. The American Tradition Institute vs. Michael Mann and the
University of Virginia
Michael Mann is internationally known for his research that culminated in
the “Hockey Stick” graph, which demonstrates a precipitous rise in twentieth
century temperature caused by human activity (Mann et al. 1998, 1999). Mann, the
recipient of numerous honors and awards for his research, began his academic
career at the University of Virginia, where he was an Assistant Professor in the
Department of Environmental Sciences from 1999 to 2005. In 2010, after Mann had
accepted a position with Pennsylvania State University, Republican Virginia
Attorney General Ken Cuccinelli, a self-described climate skeptic, filed a civil
investigative demand for emails related to Mann’s work. A civil investigative
demand allows the Attorney General to subpoena materials from state agencies to
investigate fraud. After the request was made, UVA signaled that the university
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would comply with it, but then opposition formed from groups such as the American
Association of University Professors (AAUP) and the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU), causing UVA administrators to reconsider the university’s position. Later,
the UVA Faculty Senate approved a formal message in support of Michael Mann,
stating that
[Cuccinelli’s] action and the potential threat of legal prosecution of
scientific endeavor that has satisfied peer-review standards sends a
chilling message to scientists engaged in basic research involving
Earth’s climate and indeed to any scholars in any discipline. Such
actions directly threaten academic freedom and, thus, our ability to
generate the knowledge upon which informed public policy relies
(Mann 2012, p. 238-239).
That next month, UVA challenged Cuccinelli in state court and won, successfully
demonstrating that the Attorney General lacked evidence that Mann was engaged in
fraud, but the Attorney General’s office nevertheless appealed to the Virginia
Supreme Court, where it again lost.4 Although Cuccinelli fell short in his case against
UVA, the litigation nevertheless reinforced his bona fides as a candidate
conservative enough to win the Virginia GOP’s 2013 gubernatorial primary race and
brought renewed attention to the possibility of exposing salacious emails. This, in
turn, prompted ATI to submit a request for Mann’s emails, this time under Virginia’s
FOIA law.
ATI is a 501(c)3 organization that describes itself as a free market think tank.
Its General Counsel, David Schnare, a former EPA employee, has served alongside
well-known climate denialists like Myron Ebell on the Trump Transition landing
team. Schnare’s collaborator, Chris Horner, a “Senior Fellow” at the Competitive
Enterprise Institute, an organization with ties to the coal industry, is the Senior
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Legal Fellow at ATI, “where he provides strategic and legal counsel on cases
involving Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) filings and government
transparency.”5
After ATI submitted its public records request, the Union of Concerned
Scientists (UCS), AAUP, and the ACLU asked UVA President Teresa Sullivan to invoke
exemptions under the state FOIA law to protect Mann’s emails from being released
(States News Service 2011a). The records that are exempt from the open records
law include
data, records or information of a proprietary nature produced or
collected by or for faculty or staff of public institutions of higher
education, other than the institutions’ financial or administrative
records, in the conduct of or as a result of study or research on
medical, scientific, technical or scholarly issues, whether sponsored
by the institution alone or in conjunction with a governmental body or
a private concern, where such data, records or information has not
been publicly released, published, copyrighted or patented (Virginia
Code § 2.2-3705.4(4)).
Disagreement formed between ATI and UVA over the meaning of “proprietary,” with
the university arguing that it should be interpreted broadly and ATI arguing
otherwise. With both sides at an impasse, the trial court ordered that UVA label as
proprietary whichever emails in its possession it deemed so and then to produce
them
in a form to be agreed upon between the parties . . . [so that ATI
would] have 90 days after receipt of the Exempt Information to
review it, negotiate with the Respondents, and if they choose, file a
petition with the Court for in camera review for determination as to
whether the Respondent properly designated the records as Exempt
Information (American Tradition Institute, et al. v. Rector and Visitors
of the University of Virginia, et al. 2014 at 4).
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At about the same time that the trial court required both sides to settle their
disagreement under the FOIA law, Mann received support from the American
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), publisher of the journal Science,
which denounced the “personal attacks,” “harassment,” “death threats,” and “legal
challenges” that Mann was being subjected to (PR Newswire 2011b; Foster 2011).
That fall, Mann received additional support when Scott Mandia of Suffolk
County Community College formed what became the Climate Science Legal Defense
Fund (CSLDF) (State News Service 2011c; Hurley 2011). Within 24 hours of writing
a letter to his colleagues to solicit money in support of Mann’s legal defense, Mandia
raised $10,000 from the scientific community, which grew to $30,000 by January
2012. In addition to providing financial support, CSLDF formed relationships with
Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER), which had the
organizational capacity to do things that CSLDF could not. PEER organized a
network of law firms that pledged legal services to embattled scientists throughout
the United States (Jamieson 2012), which allowed Mann to file a motion to intervene
in UVA’s case, arguing that his former employer could not alone protect his
“interests in privacy, academic freedom, and free speech,” a motion that was granted
that November (American Tradition Institute 2014 at 5).
Almost a year passed, and, the following September, Prince William County
Circuit Court Judge Paul Sheridan ruled in favor of Mann and UVA (Jackman 2012).
ATI appealed the circuit court decision to the Virginia Supreme Court, where the
state’s highest court was tasked with determining what was meant by “proprietary.”
Mann’s legal team argued that if the definition of “proprietary” proffered by ATI was
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adopted by the court, then it followed that Virginia’s General Assembly must have
intended a narrow definition of “proprietary” while fully aware that a narrow
definition of the term would cause the commonwealth’s public universities to suffer
competitively against private universities. To advance its argument, UVA’s Vice
President and Provost John Simon, who at one time served as a Vice-Provost at Duke
University, submitted an affidavit that the Court relied upon in making its ruling.
Simon wrote,
Scientists at private institutions such as Duke, where I previously
worked, that are not subject to state freedom of information statutes,
will not feel that it is possible to continue collaborations with
scientists at public institutions if doing so means that every email or
other written communication discussing data, preliminary results,
drafts of papers, review of grant proposals, or other research related
activities is subject to public release under a state FOIA in
contravention of scholarly norms and expectations of privacy and
confidentiality. . . . I can state unequivocally that recruitment of faculty
to an institution like the University of Virginia will be deeply harmed
if such faculty must fear that their unpublished communications with
their scientific collaborators and scholarly colleagues are subject to
involuntary disclosure (American Tradition Institute 2014 at 15-16).
The Virginia Supreme Court agreed, ruling that Mann’s emails fell under the
ordinary meaning of the term “proprietary” and that the legislature never could
have intended to place the commonwealth’s public institutions at a competitive
disadvantage against private ones. The Court specifically found that
competitive disadvantage implicates . . . harm to university-wide
research efforts, damage to faculty recruitment and retention,
undermining of faculty expectations of privacy and confidentiality,
and impairment of free thought and expression (American Tradition
Institute 2014 at 15).
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This high-profile legal victory in Virginia gave American scientists the national
recognition needed to draw more attention to their efforts to protect the integrity of
the research process.
After the Virginia case, climate researchers continued building the additional
capacity needed to win future legal battles against climate change deniers, who
were increasingly turning to the courts. In 2015, for instance, the UCS’s Michael
Halpern produced a 20-page report through its Center for Science and Democracy
called “Freedom to Bully: How Laws Intended to Free Information are used to
Harass Researchers,” which detailed examples of egregious “open records attacks”
and how “[s]nooping on researchers’ email has become the twenty-first century
equivalent of tapping their phone lines or bugging a lab’s water cooler” (3). Most
importantly, the litigation campaign against climate researchers produced the
CSLDF, which now uses Columbia Law School as its mailing address and has grown
to a staff of four.

C. E&E Legal vs. Jonathan Overpeck and Malcolm Hughes
Michael Mann’s success in Virginia did not stop ATI from using open records
statutes to request emails from others who were associated with Mann and the
professional community of climate scientists. ATI changed its name to the Energy &
Environmental Legal Institute (E&E Legal) and then set its sights on Jonathan
Overpeck and Malcolm Hughes, two prominent climate scientists from the
University of Arizona, who E&E Legal claimed “were prominently featured in two
separate [email] releases in 2009 and 2011 known colloquially as ‘Climategate’”
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(Energy & Environmental Legal Institute 2014 at 4). In Arizona, public records are
made available to “inspection by any person and at all times” (A.R.S. § 39-121).
Under this law, E&E Legal submitted an open records request to the University of
Arizona for a period from 1999 to 2006,6 producing 1,600 pages of documents that
were submitted to the organization and over 1,700 that, “due to considerations of
privacy, confidentiality, academic freedom, and the competition for and retention of
faculty members, and other factors,” were withheld (Energy & Environmental Legal
Institute v Arizona Board of Regents, et al. 2015b at 4). E&E Legal promptly sued the
Arizona Board of Regents (AzBOR) for the 1,700 emails, arguing that disputes raised
under the Arizona public records statute should always be resolved with the
presumption being in favor of disclosing public records, unless the state can
demonstrate that the delivery of the records will cause material harm. E&E Legal,
furthermore, argued that “generalized” claims of academic freedom are “insufficient
as a matter of law” (Energy & Environmental Legal Institute 2014 at 13). Its
attorneys argued,
that the chilling effect cited by AzBOR is contrary to fundamental
scientific principles of openness and transparency which promote
public confidence in scientific research…[and that the benefits of] the
content of the contested emails to the public at large greatly exceeds
any potential reduction in collaboration between some scientists and
professors at public universities (Energy & Environmental Legal
Institute v Arizona Board of Regents, et al. 2015a).
E&E Legal, furthermore, argued that AzBOR had abused its discretion and acted in
an arbitrary or capricious matter by not disclosing the emails (Energy &
Environmental Legal Institute 2015a).
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Hughes and Overpeck, however, responded that the open records requests
were intrusive and time intensive. In an affidavit filed with the court, Professor
Hughes (2014), who was Mann’s co-author, explained that complying with the open
records request,
was and continues to be a very burdensome and dispiriting task that
diverted my energies and attention from productive work to a notable
degree. The task of reviewing my emails for information responsive to
Petitioner’s broad demands took at least ten weeks of my time. . . .
This E&E matter deprived me of one of the small handful of summers
remaining in my career. Given my general level of activity, this is a
significant loss, not only to me professionally, but also to my
department at the UA (4-5).
Furthermore, Hughes described in his affidavit how public records requests had
impacted his collaboration with others. He testified that,
I have been directly informed by several colleagues that they have
limited their email communications with me because I have been
targeted in public records requests. As email is the essential medium
of scientific cooperation in the modern world, there is no doubt that
this chilling effect has been an obstacle to collaboration (Hughes 2014,
8-9).
In addition to his claim that the open records requests had interfered with his ability
to collaborate with others, Hughes also testified that these requests undermined
principles of academic freedom at public universities. His affidavit included a
reference to a letter he sent to UVA’s president Teresa Sullivan in support of Mann,
in which he wrote,
Nothing is more likely to squash the creativity of America’s scientists
than the ever-present ear of a hostile listener intent on finding, at all
costs, the appearance of malfeasance. Nothing is more calculated to
discourage research into topics that may challenge powerful interests
than the telephone tap, or its modern cousin the carefully cherrypicked phrase in one out of thousands of emails. . . . It is indeed the
modern ‘hostile ear’ (Hughes 2014, 9).
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In support of this testimony, the University of Arizona, in arguing against disclosure
of the records, claimed that “the basis for not producing these documents is that to
do so would have a chilling effect on the ability and likelihood of professors and
scientists engaging in frank exchanges of ideas and information” (Energy &
Environmental Legal Institute 2015a at 3).
In addition to hearing these arguments, Pima County Superior Court Judge
James Marner examined a collection of ninety representative emails, which ranged
from one page to over 800 pages in length, and described them as so “technical and
esoteric” that he was not “able to fully comprehend the substance of [them]”
(Energy & Environmental Legal Institute 2015a at 1). He ruled that AzBOR had not
abused its discretion to withhold the emails, a decision that E&E Legal appealed to
the Arizona Court of Appeals that same year. This time, the appellate court ruled
that the standard of review of placing the burden on E&E Legal to persuade the
court of disclosure was wrongly chosen. Rather, the appellate court ruled, the trial
judge should have weighed whether the “disclosure of the records would be
detrimental to the best interests of the state against the presumption in favor of
disclosure” (Energy & Environmental Institute 2015b at 8). In response to this ruling,
the case was remanded back to the Pima County Superior Court where, on June 14,
2016, Judge Marner ruled under the alternative standard of review that Overpeck
and Hughes were compelled to produce their email correspondence and deliver it to
E&E Legal. Judge Marner wrote,
…the Court finds that AzBOR has not met its burden justifying its
decision to withhold the subject emails. In making this finding, the
Court does not ignore the repeated “chilling effect” concerns raised in
the affidavits and in the pleadings. However, the Court concludes that
17

this potential harm is speculative at best, and does not overcome the
presumption favoring disclosure of public records containing
information about a topic as important and far-reaching as global
warming and its potential causes. . . . [AzBOR goes] beyond
championing academic freedom and, in effect, promotes the creation
of an academic privilege exception to [the Arizona open records law].
This is a proposition more properly made to the legislature rather
than the courts (Energy & Environmental Legal Institute v Arizona
Board of Regents, et al. 2016 at 4).
The not-yet-resolved Arizona litigation raises a key, yet unanswered, empirical
question about the effect of disclosure on the research activities of public employees
at universities: to what extent do these open records campaigns affect the research
activities, including those relating to speech, of public university researchers?
While the open records campaigns in Virginia and Arizona represent two
high-profile efforts by ATI to release scholarly correspondence, a PBS Frontline
documentary called Climate of Doubt demonstrates how numerous climate
researchers across the country are now being targeted by these campaigns. That is
why it is critically important to learn more about the empirical effect of FOIA
requests on the day-to-day activities of university professors and researchers. If
there is support for the legal claims of climate researchers and public universities
that open records requests of research and email correspondence (1) can place
public universities at a disadvantage vis-à-vis private institutions, (2) will have a
chilling effect on university professors in their deliberations with colleagues, and/or
(3) will take away time that would ordinarily be spent conducting research for the
public, then I should expect to see evidence of those claims during in-depth personal
interviews with public university researchers and professors who have experienced
these requests. In order to collect empirical evidence concerning the effect of these
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FOIA requests, I conducted personal interviews with twelve university researchers
and professors who have been asked to comply with open records requests for
scholarly correspondence.
III. Methodology
To understand the extent to which open records request campaigns affect the
behavior of public university professors, I conducted semi-structured interviews
with researchers and scientists to learn more about the experiences of those having
to comply with them. It became immediately evident that I would only be able to
determine the impact of these open records requests by increasing my sample size
to include, in addition to climate scientists, other researchers and scientists who
have been asked to comply with these requests. I therefore widened my sampling
strategy to include all researchers who have experienced requests for scholarly
correspondence on some matter of public policy.7 Doing so allowed me to increase
the number of observations, making it possible to “transform an intractable problem
that has an indeterminate research design into a tractable one” (King, Keohane, and
Verba 1994, 208). While it is reasonable to assume that university researchers
outside of the climate research network will report similar experiences as climate
researchers in my interviews, I am nevertheless careful to describe when a
participant is one of the three climate researchers that are part of my sample when
reporting my interview data.
Qualitative research designs that examine a limited number of in-depth
observations typically employ a purposive sampling method (e.g., Fenno 1978).
Given the challenges of increasing the sample size of my pool of interviewees, I
19

employed a diverse sampling strategy that required (1) identifying researchers who
were publicly identified as having been required to comply with an open records
request and (2) recruiting participants through listservs of both the Law & Courts
Section of the American Political Science Association and the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). After each interview, I employed a snowball
sampling strategy where participants were asked to identify additional recipients of
open records requests. This type of sampling strategy is often used when “studying
a relatively select, rare, or difficult-to-locate population” (Johnson, Reynolds, and
Mycoff 2016, 229). In all, I completed twelve in-depth phone interviews with
respondents who reported having been asked to comply with an open records
request, including three climate researchers and nine others specializing in the
fields of labor studies, biotechnology, political science, and public health.
I used a semi-structured interview approach while asking respondents
questions during my interviews. Semi-structured interviews typically involve a
structured set of questions, but also allow investigators to ask follow-up questions
and to clarify points that are made by respondents (Obasogie 2014). The
confidential interviews, which last no less than thirty minutes and no longer than
one hour, involved questions relating to the time spent complying with FOIA
requests, the effect of FOIA requests on relationships with colleagues both inside
and outside of the university, and the effect of the requests on activities relating to
how the respondents express research findings and viewpoints both within and
outside of academic settings. In light of the fact that my interview respondents were
professionals who had experienced an intrusion of privacy, I recognized the
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importance of masking the identities of interviewees as soon as I began transcribing
the audio-recorded interviews (Kvale 1996). In some cases, these individuals had
already had the experience of being thrust into the public spotlight through no
choice of their own. In order to reassure my respondents that their audio recorded
interviews would not be discoverable by an open records request through my
university, I immediately transcribed the interviews verbatim and deleted the audio
recording.8 Due to the semi-structured nature of the interviews, the coding scheme
employed for this study was straightforward: initial reactions upon learning about
the open records requests were coded as positive, negative, and neutral; the time
burden of complying with the request was coded as minimal, moderate, or
disruptive; respondents’ reported changes in communication patterns in response
to the requests were coded as changing to non-official email accounts, changing to
more phone calls to avoid email use, changing to become more cognizant of what is
written in emails, and no effect; whether respondents reported experiencing an
academic chilling effect was coded as either having a chilling effect or having no
chilling effect; and the effect of the information request on collaboration with peers
outside of the university was coded as either having an effect or having no effect.
Before sharing the empirical results of these interviews with FOIA request
recipients, it is important to note at the outset that one shortcoming of my sampling
strategy is that I may only be speaking with researchers who are willing to share
their experiences with me. For instance, I suspect that I may have undersampled
researchers whose negative experiences may have kept them from speaking with
me. One person who chose not to participate, for example, was concerned that
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participating in the interview would cause the organization that had originally filed
an open records request against her to retaliate. If my sample of participants
includes only researchers who are willing to speak about their experiences, then it is
reasonable to conclude that the personal interviews that I have collected so far
might represent a “best-case-scenario” as it relates to the effect of FOIA requests.
Furthermore, the respondents that have been interviewed are sharing perceptions
with me, and so the interview responses may not accurately reflect the underlying
effects of having experienced a FOIA request. In other words, the insights that are
drawn from my interview should be interpreted with caution because they might
understate the empirical effect of open records requests on the activities of
university researchers. With this caveat having been made clear, I turn now to the
interview results.
IV. Evidence of FOIA Request Effects from Interviews with University
Professors.
A. Initial Reactions after Learning about Information Requests.
While working to understand the effect of FOIA requests on university
professors, I was interested in learning more about the range of emotions that
researchers experience after learning about a FOIA request for the first time. If the
initial reaction to learning about a FOIA request was negative or positive, then I
expected that experience to be reflected in the participant’s response to a question
about his or her initial reaction. One participant described anxiety after initially
learning about the request, responding,
My first impression was that [a group that disagreed with my
research] was issuing the FOIA request and they had been publicly not
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nice to me [in the past]. They’ve attacked me in public with press
releases and website stuff, and I decided to take the high road. But my
first impression was that they were escalating something, and I was
uncomfortable with the FOIA request because of that at first (Personal
Interview #1).
One climate researcher described experiencing panic after learning about the
request but then experiencing a completely different range of emotions. This
researcher responded,
I think you panic. You’re also mad because it was pretty clear that
what these people were doing was using a really good law. . . . They
weren’t trying to understand anything in particular. They were fishing
through my emails hoping to find something that was embarrassing . .
. so I was a little bit mad (Personal Interview #5).
Another pre-tenure female scientist, who had not yet learned that an open records
request had been made, received a phone call from her dean who wanted to arrange
a meeting. She explained her initial reaction after having learned about the request
by recounting the following story:
I was scared. I was mostly scared because when the dean wants to talk
to you and you don’t know why and they won’t put it in writing, that’s
kind of a big deal. . . . To be honest, even though I have never done
anything wrong, I was scared and angry (Personal Interview #10).
Yet another climate researcher expressed shock at being asked to comply with a
FOIA request:
Why is this happening? I’m a scientist, I’m trying to understand how
the Earth works, I’m not trying to do anything that’s political. . . . I
understand that this has become a political football, but that doesn’t
mean I’m doing anything related to that, so it was shocking because I
never thought that I would be FOIA’d for that kind of information
(Personal Interview #6).
While shock and panic might best describe the initial reactions from university
researchers, others reported being confused about what to do after receiving a FOIA
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request. One climate researcher was especially confused because, after receiving a
FOIA request for the first time, the researcher was working as part of a network of
state and federal institutions. The researcher explained,
It was unclear if I had to comply [with the request]. What really was
horrible was that I contacted [my organization’s] attorney and their
general counsel. They didn’t know what to do. I contacted the
university counsel. They didn’t know what to do. Then I contacted
[another organization’s] general counsel. They made the request, so
they kept telling me, “Oh just hand them over and we will decide
what’s discoverable.” It got bad enough that I almost thought about
getting my own attorney because of this (Personal Interview #3).
While a number of researchers were initially confused when first notified that their
records were requested, others described the requests as a nuisance. Public
employees who interpreted the requests as a nuisance also explained that the
organization requesting their records was doing so as part of a “fishing expedition”
or a “witchhunt.” One participant explained,
. . . it was a pain in the ass having to deal with this when there were
real things I was working on. When I say that this is harassment, one
of the things is that they want to have you occupied with responding
to them rather than doing the substantive work that you are doing.
When I say that it is a fishing expedition, its because it was—the
[search] terms [requested] had no obvious relationship to each other
and included lots of terms that had nothing at all to do with my work,
so it was obviously clear to me that this was not an inquiry into a
specific thing but was a “let’s see what we can find and let’s harass
him to do all this searching for us.” So that was my initial reaction: this
is a pain in the ass (Personal Interview #7).
The insights that were drawn from my interviews with women in the
profession also shed light on the differential impact of these requests on their
workplace experiences. I had the opportunity to interview three women in the
profession who experienced these requests, and two out of the three women used
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the analogy of having a stranger rummaging through their underwear drawers to
describe their experiences. One described it this way:
Ridiculous how many emails we had to go through. Hundreds of
thousands of emails, which—just knowing anyone is going through
your email line by line is very uncomfortable. It’s like someone
rustling through your underwear drawer. You know it’s all clean, but
you don’t want anybody doing it, right? (Personal Interview #12).
Another researcher described the experience as “like someone is digging through
my underwear drawer, but all I have in my underwear drawer is underwear, and in
the end everyone wears underwear” (Personal Interview #10). All three of the
women in the profession that I interviewed reported having experienced violations
of privacy as part of their efforts to comply with these information requests.
Yet, not all of the reactions to learning about FOIA requests were negative.
One participant had experienced FOIA requests multiple times due to having a
history of employment in government. This employee took the information request
in stride, and explained how the request actually “set the record straight”:
In some ways I was thankful for the opportunity to set the record
straight to show [the requestor], #1 that [the requestor] had written
several blog posts about how I . . . was only teaching one course in the
fall semester and I was able to document that that was not the case. . . .
It really gave me a chance to document a bunch of stuff [my
requestor] would have never seen just by looking at the [university]
website. I kind of thought it was, in the end, sort of a good thing
because it kind of shut [my requestor] up (Personal Interview #2).
Overall, eleven out of twelve of my participants reported experiences that can be
described as negative—words like “shock,” “panic,” “scared,” “nuisance,”
“harassment,” “disturbed,” “upset,” “worried,” and “confusion” were all used— after
initially learning about these information requests, while only one of my
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participants expressed a positive experience of being able to “set the record
straight.”
B. The Time Burden of FOIA Requests
When litigants challenge open records requests through the courts, they
usually claim that FOIA requests take away time that they would ordinarily be able
to spend with students, in research, or on service-related activities. In the affidavit
signed by Malcolm Hughes (2014), he claimed to have spent an inordinate amount
of time attempting to comply with E&E Legal’s open records request. It is clear that
researchers, such as Professor Hughes, who legally challenge these requests will
spend more time on them than those who do not, and so it is important to note that
all but one of my participants did not formally challenge these requests in court.
Furthermore, some universities assign an employee to serve as the custodian of
public records so that if there is an information request, it is an administrator,
attorney, or staff member who fulfills the request.
My research participants reported a range of responses when asked about
the time they spent complying with FOIA requests, and their answers depended on
the extent to which administrators were responsible for compliance and the number
of exceptions that were articulated in the state open records law. One respondent
described the time spent complying with the request as a “minor nuisance”
(Personal Interview #2). When asked if it took away from time spent with students,
research, or service the respondent replied,
Really none at all. . . . I probably spent an hour on the phone with the
lawyer. Maybe two phone conversations—a total of an hour. And then
probably another hour collecting the records that [the administrator]
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needed from me. So it was just a miniscule part of over a two-week
period (Personal Interview #2).
Another respondent reported that it had a “minor effect,” requiring only “two to
three hours” to comply (Personal Interview #1). When administrators were
responsible for collecting the emails and addressing the legal issues associated with
the request, some of the researchers I spoke with reported that the requests had a
very minor effect on the time they spent on their work-related responsibilities. One
climate scientist responded,
It had essentially no impact on [teaching, research, or service]. . . . I’ve
heard stories about people having to spend like a summer going
through emails. I didn’t do any of that. The IT people downloaded the
email, they searched all the keywords, and they gave them to the
general counsel’s office. I probably had to spend maybe a total of a day
or two days sort of dealing with legal issues (Personal Interview #5).
Others, however, reported spending far more time complying with the
request, and this might be due to the sophistication of the groups making the
requests. One climate scientist reported,
It took me three days culling through my own personal laptop just to
make sure, did I have anything? That was really frustrating because it
felt like such a waste of time. . . . . It was a witch-hunt, and it just was
ridiculous (Personal Interview #3).
Another climate researcher reported that searching through emails to submit to the
university in fulfillment of a FOIA request
took two or three days of my time basically—many thousands of
emails—because being on the IPCC assessment, particularly, I had
been doing numerous emails everyday. It was later determined by the
way that none of those emails connected with IPCC were even
allowable because it was a report in progress . . . But nonetheless I had
to spend a lot of time going through all those. I don’t know how much
time it ate up but it was certainly a week to ten days. So what
happened [was] the university went back to . . . the lawyer and said
you have to narrow the request because you can’t be making such a
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broad thing over such a long period of time. We’re talking about
thousands of emails here, so the lawyer then came back with a smaller
request. So I had to go through them again and extract out what was
for that time period. We ended up doing that three different times,
until we finally got things. All in all, I don’t know how much time it
cost me. Probably several weeks of my time. Plus some heartburn
having to deal with this [laughs] (Personal Interview #6).
There were others not involved in climate research who described the email
requests as disruptive to their research efforts. One participant explained,
I had probably fifteen hours worth of meetings with my department
chair, with the university lawyer, with the faculty union
representative. There are only so many hours in a week. I already, to
be honest, work about eighty-five to ninety hours a week. Those
fifteen hours had to come from somewhere, so it was less time doing
research because usually when students are standing at the door you
don’t ignore them (Personal Interview #10).
Another researcher estimated that it took eighty hours to comply with one FOIA
request, while the smaller requests tended to take between six to ten hours. Overall,
of the twelve participants who were interviewed, four participants (Interviewees
#1, #2, #7, and #8) reported that requests had, at most, a moderate effect on the
time they spent on teaching, research, and services activities; one participant
(Interviewee #5) described it as having an effect because they spent a couple of days
addressing the legal issues; and seven participants (Interviewees #3, #4, #6, #9,
#10, #11, and #12) described the requests as very disruptive.
C. Altering Methods of Communication
As part of my research about the effect of FOIA requests, I am also interested
in how these requests change the behavior of employees working for the public. If
FOIA requests alter the communication patterns of university researchers, then I
expect to see that reflected in the responses of my research participants. The fact
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that public universities provide email systems, in some cases, means that
information that becomes part of university servers is in the public domain. Yet if
scholars alter their means of communication in response to an information request,
perhaps by switching to a private email system, then it is possible that these altered
behaviors will eliminate legitimate public information, which would further prevent
information of public interest from ever reaching the public domain.
In my interviews, I learned that my research participants reported seeking
new ways of communicating with others. One research participant began using the
“direct message” function on Twitter to communicate the results of research that
had policy implications (Personal Interview #1). Another “set up a separate Gmail
account for correspondence with people that could possibly be political in nature. So
I have two email accounts. One with my [university] account, and the other one is a
Gmail [account]” (Personal Interview #4). One climate researcher began avoiding
email correspondence altogether after experiencing a FOIA request. According to
this participant, “I make a lot more phone calls than I used to, that’s the truth.
Honestly, in emails there are just certain things . . . [to avoid] when we know that
there is something that is gonna be a touchy issue” (Personal Interview #3).
Conducting business over the phone became a common theme among researchers in
the profession. One put it this way: “We preferred to do direct phone or some other
source that couldn’t be FOIA’d just to avoid the hassle” (Personal Interview #12).
While the four participants above actually changed the medium used for
communication, others began self-censoring their correspondence with others when
using email. One participant became “more conscious of the need for being
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scrupulous about not communicating in a non-official [university] way on my official
[university] account” (Personal Interview #2). A climate researcher reported
avoiding telling jokes via email:
[The request] does make me more careful about what I write in
emails. My working assumption now is anything I write could be
released, so I don’t make jokes in emails like I may have done
previously. . . . I don’t do that because someone might think I’m being
serious or something like that (Personal Interview #5).
One participant described imagining “a lawyer from the [requestor’s] industry
looking over my shoulder” when writing emails (Personal Interview #11). One
climate researcher explained that,
I don’t put things in emails that could be misconstrued. [I’m]
[c]ertainly more cautious about emails, particularly in joking around,
as I often do. Just to make sure there wasn’t something that
somebody’s gonna take out of context (Personal Interview #6).
The same participant went on to express concern about other researchers who
might be subjected to FOIA requests,
I think I get more concerned about others. . . . In emails with [other
climate researchers] I would be a little careful in sticking to the topic
because we knew it was likely to be FOIA’d. But it didn’t keep me from
discussing the science or anything; it really was just being a little
careful to say things that wouldn’t be taken out of context. . . . There’s
various colleagues I knew [who] had been FOIA’d or were likely to be
FOIA’d, including one of my former students . . . who I interact with a
lot still. I just have to be a little more careful, but it really hasn’t
affected what science I do at all. I don’t allow it to (Personal Interview
#6).
Some researchers became more careful about disseminating data via email than
they had in the past, with one researcher describing it this way:
I think if a colleague has asked me to send some data or send a file or
whatever I would have very easily done that. Now, since I’m worried
that it can just be grabbed and taken out of context by a FOIA request,
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I’m very reluctant to send those sorts of things by email. I’ve saved
data differently than I used to (Personal Interview #12).
My interviews with participants shed more light on the effect of FOIA requests on
their day-to-day communication patterns in the workplace. Three participants
reported using nonofficial university means for communicating (Interviewees #1,
#4, and #7), four participants described addressing “touchy” matters or business
over the phone to avoid an email record (Interviewees #3, #8, #10, #11, and #12),
and six reported becoming more cognizant of how they are communicating
information using public email systems (Interviewees #2, #5, #6, #10, #11, and
#12).
D. Communicating Research via Email
In the litigation surrounding open records requests, organizations like the
AAUP and the UCS argue that the request for researchers’ email correspondence is
likely to have a chilling effect on how researchers deliberate about the policy
implications of their research. In fact, Malcolm Hughes and several other
researchers who have challenged open records requests have testified about having
themselves experienced a chilling effect due to these requests.
If open records requests for the personal correspondence of university
researchers do, in fact, have a chilling effect on how researchers deliberate via
email, then I expect my research participants to describe those changes in their
responses. While above I have shown how several respondents reported altering the
methods by which they communicate with others, I learned during my interviews
that FOIA requests, no matter how intrusive, did not alter the way many of my
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participants communicated their research findings. Five participants (Interviews
#2, #3, #4, #6, and #9) unequivocally responded that the open records requests had
no impact on how they communicate their research findings with others via email.
Here is one of the responses from a climate researcher:
I can honestly say [that the request did not change the way I
communicate research]. . . . I’ve always been in the realm of policy
relevance, but not policy perspectives. . . . I won’t say, “because of X
result, thou shalt do this.” I will say, “Here’s a tradeoff related to
different decisions one might make from a scientific perspective.” I’ve
always been like that. . . . I just don’t wanna look like an asshole
(Personal Interview #3).
One participant described being more “careful about saying things that are within
the bounds of my empirical findings” (Personal Interview #1), while one climate
scientist explained,
As I said before, it makes me a little more careful when I write email. I
carefully consider what I’m gonna say with the assumption that it will
be released at some point. If it never is, fine. But if it is, then I didn’t
say anything stupid. It hasn’t at all changed [how I communicate
research findings] (Personal Interview #5).
Nine of my interviews did not report actually having experienced a chilling effect on
scholarly inquiry or discourse about research findings. In one case, the request
actually emboldened the participant, a climate researcher, who explained,
I have a very low threshold for outrage. When you do climate science
its easy to get outraged at the people who are fighting against the
science and trying to stop scientists from working. So, if anything, [the
request] sort of incentivized me to do even more (Personal Interview
#5).
Even though the majority of my research participants did not find that open records
requests led them to suppress their ideas, one of my respondents reported having
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become more cautious about responding to emails from the general public. This
participant explained,
I have been even more cautious than I was before about who I do
interviews with; I sometimes assume that emails that come from
people that I don’t know who they are, are traps to try to trick me into
saying something that would be inflammatory. I feel uncomfortable
talking (Personal Interview #10).
Another participant described being less open about expressing research ideas. The
participant described it this way:
It changes my openness I guess. The ease with which I would talk
about the research that I’m doing. You’d think that you’d want to do
that without worrying about it. You talk about research ideas and
findings and what you think about this or that. But I just have to be
really careful I think in communications (Personal Interview #11).
All but one of my research participants did not legally challenge the open records
requests, and so it may be possible that those choosing to legally challenge open
records requests are more likely to experience chilling effects. The one participant
who challenged the open records request in court did report the request having a
chilling effect both in how research findings were communicated and in the extent
to which the participant engaged in “political activity . . . outside of work” (Personal
Interview #[Redacted]9). Furthermore, it is worth reminding the reader that my
collection of interviews have been drawn from participants who are willing to
describe their experiences to me. It is possible that those choosing not to participate
made that decision on the basis of having experienced a chilling effect.

E. Collaborating with Peers from Private Institutions

33

One negative effect of FOIA requests that is regularly cited by supporters of
climate scientists is that collaboration between public and private researchers will
suffer if emails from private institutions are caught up in information requests
against researchers from public institutions. In fact, both the affidavit filed by
Hughes (2014) and the testimony received during the Mann litigation in Virginia
suggest that public university professors will be less likely to collaborate with their
peers at private universities because doing so would require private university
researchers to correspond and share data over public technology systems. I
expected to see evidence of that when asking my research participants about their
ability to collaborate with others in the aftermath of FOIA requests, yet none of my
research participants gave examples of collaboration suffering as a consequence of
having experienced a FOIA request.

V. Discussion and Conclusion.
By mobilizing open records campaigns against university scientists, it can be
argued that conservative legal groups have adopted the same tactics as their liberal
public interest forbears. Opponents argue that these campaigns burden the speech
rights of university professors and interfere with their professional obligation to
generate new forms of knowledge. That is why I set out to learn about the
consequences of these tactics. I found through my personal interviews that
researchers overwhelmingly report negative experiences after having first learned
about a FOIA request, in response to which they adopt new forms of communication
to avoid material from being made a matter of public record. They also, depending
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on who is responsible for fulfilling these requests, incur significant time burdens
that interfere with the production of research and knowledge.
This is critically important because today’s complex environmental problems
are knowledge intensive and require the generation of information on a scale never
before seen. The consequences caused by the execution of these tactics, moreover,
are borne by a small group of public university researchers whose generation of
knowledge serves a broad public purpose in addressing the difficult environmental
problems that confront today’s citizens and that will be passed on to future
generations. The requests not only interfere with the production of knowledge but
also impose the additional burden of placing public universities at a disadvantage
vis-à-vis private institutions. If anti-reflexive groups are successful in their
continued assault on knowledge generation at public universities, it is possible that
resources for impact science will shift to privately-held institutions where access to
knowledge is more limited than in public institutions.
This study of the legal mobilization of conservative public interest groups has
additional implications for theories of legal mobilization. Legal mobilization
theorists have shown how resorting to legal instruments can democratize the policy
process by opening venues to political participation that were once closed and can
be a powerful symbol for the marginalized as they work to make rights-based claims
(McCann 1994). Open records laws were designed to facilitate access and
participation in these venues (e.g., Harrington and Carter 2015), but it appears that
today they have become a tool used by CCCM groups to manufacture doubt in fields
of impact science. If this is a tactic that is commonly being used by CCCM groups,
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then one can expect that these tactics will be adopted in other policy areas where
scientists are actively generating knowledge to address today’s complex challenges.
Yet the conclusions that can be drawn from my interviews suggest that open
records campaigns have not dramatically affected deliberation among researchers,
who continue to interpret data and report their findings. Rather, the norms of
careful scientific deliberation appear to be so strong that they are withstanding the
threat posed by these litigation campaigns. While I did not find evidence of acrossthe-board chilling effects on academic research, the frequency or magnitude of
chilling effects is not dispositive of the potentially negative impact of open records
laws on the academic research process. Scholarly breakthroughs might, for instance,
be stunted by the self-censorship of a reluctant collaborator who opts against
making the kind of impulsive, off-the-wall, or controversial interpretation through
email that might otherwise have the potential to spark new ideas and fundamentally
alter and extend the frontiers of human and scientific knowledge.
Aside from the empirical effect of the open records campaigns being waged
by groups like ATI, there remain important normative concerns about how these
tactics are funded. Scholars have argued that other large-scale rights mobilization
campaigns through the judiciary are consistent with democratic norms due to their
association with broad-based interest groups (Epp 1998). If opaque organizations
like DonorsTrust are funding groups like ATI to engage in these litigation
campaigns, then it is virtually impossible to determine who is responsible for
privately funding this strategic litigation that targets public scholarship. If it is true
that groups like ATI do not have a broad membership base, then they are not likely
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to possess the democratic supports that are typical of past rights-based legal
campaigns.
Finally, because FOIA and litigation campaigns waged by CCCM groups and
others who use transparency laws to comb through emails will persist, public
universities should consider formulating policies that mitigate the negative impact
of these requests. Several of my research participants described spending less time
complying with open records requests when a public records custodian was
responsible for university compliance, and so public institutions might consider
providing institutional support for employees who are asked to comply with such
requests. Universities might also educate new faculty members during orientation
about state and university policy regarding public access to emails and appropriate
email use. Lastly, it is the responsibility of faculty, and those who represent faculty,
to understand the extent to which their state FOIA laws protect email
correspondence and other types of proprietary information. If those laws are apt to
be abused, then university faculty might consider asking their representatives to
clarify those laws, as the University of Rhode Island faculty did in 2017 when it
passed a law in Rhode Island that protects public university research.10

AARON J. LEY is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Rhode
Island.
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NOTES
1

Kemp et al. (2010) differentiate between climate deniers and climate skeptics. According to these
authors, while skepticism begins with an open mind and involves the weighing of evidence prior to
acceptance of a claim, denialism involves “conviction rather than evidence. . . . Deniers use strategies
that invoke conspiracies, quote fake experts, denigrate genuine experts, deploy evidence selectively
and create impossible expectations of what research can deliver” (Kemp et al. 2010, 673).
2 DonorsTrust offers financial backing to the GMUSL Law and Economics Center. For a full list of the
donors supporting the GMUSL Law and Economics Center, see http://masonlec.org/donors/
(accessed 05/10/2017).
3 According to The Free Market Environmental Law Clinic website on 09/12/2017, “the Directors of
FME Law engaged in a friendly and supportive discussion with the Dean of the George Mason
University School of Law and recognized that the clinic could better perform its function by servicing
multiple law schools as a stand-alone clinic. The Board thus directed a name change to reflect this
broadened purpose. . . . [The clinic] remains in close cooperation with George Mason University’s
School of Law and provides both academic courses and clinical opportunities for GMU Law students
and is expanding its externship program to other law schools that have a doctrinal focus on law and
economics.” Website archive can be found here:
https://web.archive.org/web/20161229034021/http://fmelawclinic.org/?page_id=36 (accessed
05/07/2018).
4 According to the opinion of the Court, “The University of Virginia, as an agency of the
commonwealth, does not constitute a ‘person’ under the Fraud Against Taxpayers Act and therefore
cannot be the proper subject [of a records request]” (Basken 2012).
5 See http://eelegal.org/fellows-advisors-2/ (accessed 05/10/2017)
6 The requests included emails between Malcolm Hughes and Michael Mann, emails between
Jonathan Overpeck and Phil Jones at the University of East Anglia Climate Research Unit, and
communications between Jonathan Overpeck and Caspar Ammann and/or Eugene Wahl. In addition,
ATI requested emails by Jonathan Overpeck that included the following terms: Geophysical Research
Letters, Stephen McIntyre, Jay Famiglietti, Michael Mann, Alan Robock, James Saiers, “an agu.org
email address,” and/or “deadline” (Energy & Environmental Legal Institute 2014 at 6).
7 I chose to limit my interviews to “correspondence as it relates to matters of public policy” because I
did not want to include those who have had requests due to intramural university disputes.
Increasing my sample size beyond climate researchers allows me to generalize about the experiences
of all researchers, which is critically important if we are to assume that antireflexive modernization
campaigns will occur in academic disciplines other than climate science.
8 Methodologists claim that there is no standard way of transcribing interviews, but that the style
chosen should be made explicit (Kvale 1996). Psychological and sociolinguistic analysis requires a
detailed and verbatim transcription, while for my purposes I have opted for a verbatim transcription
while leaving out the “hmms” and “umms” that are part of ordinary conversation. Given my interest
in the perceptions and initial reactions that respondents had toward the information request, I also
made note in the transcription of emotional cues and laughter.
9 Interview number redacted because of the possibility that including it would undermine the
confidentiality of the interview.
10 RIGL §38-2-2 (K).
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